This paper models the effect of rating agency competition on the quality of rated securities. The quality of the securities is unknown. In each of two periods, an issuer exerts unobservable effort to improve the quality of a security and can hire rating agencies to rate it. The rating agencies observe noisy signals of quality and assign their ratings simultaneously and non-cooperatively. Each agency can be honest or strategic. An honest agency always rates according to its signal. A strategic agency can request a bribe to issue an undeserved rating. I compare equilibria across a regime of competition between two rating agencies and a monopolistic regime. In both regimes, all available agencies are hired in equilibrium, so under competition more ratings are observed. However, competing agencies do not fully internalize the return of a reputation for being honest. Whenever strategic agencies are not very concerned about their reputation, competition can induce more issuer effort than monopoly. Otherwise, a monopolistic agency induces more effort. Finally, the model is extended to compare the equilibria with agencies observing identical signals and agencies observing conditionally independent signals.
Introduction
The recent financial crisis put credit rating agencies in the public spotlight.
1 Favorable and undeserved ratings were blamed for encouraging issuers of structured products to sell extremely low quality securities. Unlike issuers of other financial assets such as corporate bonds, issuers of structured products could design their securities to meet the requirements of the rating procedures.
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A recent report by the U.K. Financial Services Authority highlights this issue:
While a corporate bond issuer can make only limited adjustments to its balance sheet to improve its rating ... an originator of a structured credit product has an incentive and flexibility to design them in such a way as to obtain maximal ratings.
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In these markets, however, undeserved ratings not only left investors uninformed, but also encouraged issuers to originate and securitize high-risk loans.
The lack of competition in the credit rating market was blamed for the low quality of the rating process. Regulators in the United States and the European Union have argued that increased competition among rating agencies is desirable. A recent SEC report illustrates the position of the U.S. Congress:
In enacting the Rating Agency Act, Congress found that "the 2 largest credit rating agencies [Moody's and S&P] serve the vast majority of the market, and additional competition is in the public interest." 4 Will an increase in the number of available rating agencies lead to more informative ratings?
Will informative ratings induce socially efficient choices of investment in product quality? To answer these questions, I construct a two-period certification model that captures the relationship between credit ratings and the quality of rated products under different structures of the credit rating market. In every period, an issuer can exert effort to increase the quality of her security.
1 Ashcraft et al. (2011) and Benmelech and Duglosz (2009b) provide detailed accounts of the role of credit rating agencies in the recent financial crisis.
2 See the Coburn Levin Senate Report, part V, section B, and Benmelech and Duglosz (2009a) for a description of the rating process of a structured finance product. 3 Fennell and Medvedev (2011).
SEC (2012).
Quality can be any characteristic of the security that affects its value, such as expected return or riskiness. Neither the issuer's effort nor the security's quality can be observed by the buyers.
However, the issuer can hire rating agencies to observe a signal correlated with the security's quality and then assign a rating. Rating agencies are long-lived agents. They can be strategic or committed to honesty. Strategic agencies face a classic trade-off: inflate their ratings and increase current revenues, or rate honestly and preserve a reputation for honesty. In this context, I
compare equilibria across a regime of competition between two rating agencies and a monopolistic regime.
If two agencies are available in the market, I show that the issuer hires both agencies. This result matches the empirical evidence for structured finance ratings. Benmelech and Duglosz (2009b) show that over the period from 2004 to 2007 most structured finance tranches were receiving more than one rating. Rating agencies are not textbook competitors selling substitute goods. Rather, they are experts with competing opinions.
When reputation incentives are weak, that is, when rating agencies heavily discount future revenues, I show that competing agencies can provide more informative ratings than a monopolistic agency. As a result, in the competition regime the issuer has a stronger incentive to invest in the quality of her security. When reputation provides a strong discipline, a monopolistic agency induces more investment in quality.
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Even when reputation motives are weak and strategic agencies are likely to assign undeserved ratings, under the competition regime buyers have the opportunity to compare independent ratings. The presence of a low rating, for example, makes a high rating look suspicious. This opportunity to compare ratings ensures that buyers are better informed and has an indirect effect on the issuer's incentive to invest in quality. At the same time, a monopolistic agency has stronger incentives to maintain a reputation for honesty in order to induce the issuer to invest in quality. When buyers expect more effort from the issuer, they are willing to pay a higher price for a security with favorable ratings. As long as the rating fee is proportional to the 5 Monopoly and competition might also differ in the total amount of information that all agencies obtain. I abstract from this issue and assume that in the two regimes the total amount of information observed by the rating agencies is constant.
expected quality of the security, a higher security price allows the agency to request a higher fee from the issuer. If multiple agencies rate the same security, each and every agency's reputation determines the issuer's decision of effort. Competing agencies do not fully internalize the effect of their reputation. Ultimately, this externality reduces the competitors' incentives to maintain a reputation for honesty.
My results imply that competition might increase the incentive to invest in the quality of a security in markets where rating agencies are only weakly disciplined by reputation motives. One such example are markets where a large number of new securities are issued in a short amount of time, as in the case of asset-backed securities in the years preceding the financial crisis. In these markets, many ratings are assigned before the investors acquire the information necessary to evaluate the ratings' quality. At the same time, competition among rating agencies is not desirable in every rating market. In markets where the volume of ratings is constant over time, competition might be detrimental to the quality of the ratings and the investments in securities' quality.
In an extension of my model, I characterize the equilibria in the case of competition between rating agencies observing identical signals of quality. When the signals are closely correlated with the quality of the security, conditionally independent signals result in stronger incentives to invest in quality than identical signals. This paper presents the first model to simultaneously consider rating agencies' reputational incentives and issuers' investments in the quality of their securities. These issues have, so far, been considered separately. The certification models for products of endogenous quality developed by Albano and Lizzeri (2001) and Donaldson and Piacentino (2012) abstract from the reputational incentives of certifiers. Both papers conclude that a monopolistic regime in the market for certification induces inefficient amounts of investment in product quality. Under a monopolistic regime, firms under-invest in product quality, anticipating that any potential increase in revenues would be captured by the rating fees. A regime of competition would ensure lower certification fees and could mitigate this sort of hold-up problem. In my model, investment in a security's quality takes place only after the agencies set their fees. As a result, this inefficiency is not present.
A growing body of literature in quality certification considers competition among strategic certifiers. The focus is on certifiers concerned with their reputation for rating honestly. Unlike my model, this literature considers the certification of products of exogenous quality. In Bouvard and Levy (2012), firms can hire more than one rating agency to rate their security. The authors are concerned with the possibility of rating agencies developing different reputations among firms and buyers. They find, in line with my results, that reputation provides a weaker discipline for raters under competition than under monopoly. Strausz (2005) , Lo (2010) , and Camanho and Deb (2012) limit the firms to hiring, at most, one rating agency. All these models predict that monopoly always ensures more informative ratings than competition among certifiers.
In the model developed in this paper, reputational incentives are always desirable. A strategic agency that worries about its reputation will honestly report the signal privately observed.
Reputational incentives are not always socially desirable. In Mariano (2011) , rating agencies improve their reputation for expertise by disregarding private information and assigning ratings based on public information; competition among agencies exacerbates the inefficiency and results in informational losses.
In my model, the issuer does not gain from hiding unfavorable ratings as opposed to other models in which different assumptions give rise to rating shopping. Rating shopping refers to the issuers' strategy to cherry-pick the most favorable ratings. In Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) and Bolton et al. (2012) , issuers hide unfavorable ratings to deceive naïve investors. In Sangiorgi et al. (2009) , issuers publish only the most favorable ratings to attract investors who are legally required to invest only in high-rated securities. Rating shopping does not take place in my model because buyers are considered to be fully rational, and cannot be systematically deceived in equilibrium.
Finally, the informativeness of the signal observed in my model by the rating agencies is exogenous. The incentives for the raters to acquire information has been considered, among others, in Bizzotto (2012), Bouvard and Levy (2012) , and Kashyap and Kovrijnykh (2013) .
The theoretical literature on rating agencies is matched by a growing number of empirical studies. 6 These papers address questions including whether credit ratings influence the price of rated products, and the effect of new agencies on the quality of ratings by incumbents. and focuses on the ratings of the new agency. They show that S&P set higher standards than incumbent agencies for securities that received the same rating.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the monopoly case. The competition case is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 compares the different equilibria obtained in Section 2 and 3. Section 5 discusses an extension. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
Monopoly
In this section, I characterize the equilibria in a market with a single rating agency. In the next sections, I will compare the equilibria in a competition regime to the monopoly benchmark. The issuer and buyers active in the second period observe the rating assigned as well as the quality of the security in the first period. µ 2 (r M t ,q t ) denotes their updated belief about the agency's type. about the publication of an unfavorable rating.
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The issuer decides how much effort to devote to a security's quality by weighing a deterministic cost and a stochastic benefit. If the agency is not hired, the issuer has no reason to exert costly effort. If instead the agency is hired, effort increases the probability of obtaining a favorable rating without incurring the cost of a bribe. The expected amount of the bribe determines the issuer's choice of effort. In equilibrium, if a strategic agency requests a bribe, it sets the highest bribe that the issuer is willing to pay. Therefore, by Lemma 1, the bribe amounts to
In equilibrium, the bribe is paid whenever it is requested. If the issuer pays to obtain a rating for the security, her payoff equals
The issuer's choice of effort maximizes the utility defined in (2. 
Lemma 2 states that the presence of a rating agency with a high reputation is necessary but not sufficient to ensure an issuer's effort. Nevertheless, the next assumption rules out equilibria in which the issuer and the buyers coordinate on e * t (µ t ,h)=p(g|µ t ,h)=0. 9 As in equilibrium the security price does not depend on the rating fee, I drop φ t from the argument of p(r t ,φ t ) in the rest of the section. 
Lemma 3 implies that the rating fee in equilibrium does not reveal any information about the type of the agency and concludes the description of the single-period equilibrium. Before considering the complete two-period model, I illustrate the effect of the expected honesty h on the investment in effort for a quadratic cost of effort.
Quadratic cost example. Let c(e)=e
2 . Figure 2 shows equilibrium price and effort for h=0 and h=1. 10 I rule out equilibria in which the agency follows a weakly dominated strategy and requests a fee larger than what the issuer is willing to pay for a rating.
The intersections of the two curves correspond to the equilibria of the static game. For larger h the equilibrium with effort is characterized by a more effort and a higher price. The honesty For a small discount factor (δ≤δ M ), reputation motives do not discipline a strategic rating agency. In contrast, for δ>δ M , a strategic rating agency rates honestly with a positive probability.
The following corollary describes how the rating strategy depends on δ.
For larger values of δ, the strategic type mimics more closely the honest type. Corollary 5 also
states that a strategic agency is more likely to request a bribe in the first period if the agency has a better reputation. I characterize the equilibrium strategies of the issuer and the buyers in case of quadratic cost function.
Quadratic cost example. Figure 3 shows the probability that a strategic agency does not request a bribe upon observing s 
Competition
In this section, I present the equilibria in a market with two rating agencies that rate simultaneously and non-cooperatively.
The Model
In the competition regime, two rating agencies, denoted A I and A II , are present on the market.
The types of the agencies are independent, and every agency is an honest type with probability 
The Equilibria
I first consider a single-period model in which the strategic agencies rate honestly with proba-
When two rating agencies are available, the issuer can hire one, two or none. The next lemma ensures that in equilibrium both rating agencies are hired.
Lemma 6.
In equilibrium, the issuer hires both rating agencies. Accordingly, two favorable ratings are necessary to obtain a positive price:
Multiple features of my model ensure that the issuer will not hire only a single agency. 12 First of all, an additional rating cannot decrease the price paid for the security because the issuer can hide any unfavorable ratings. Moreover, Assumptions 2 and 3 ensure that two favorable ratings are a stronger signal that q t =G than a single favorable rating. Finally, the rating agencies can observe the quality signal at no cost. This extreme assumption captures the low marginal cost of the rating process. Consider an hypothetical equilibrium in which the issuer is expected to exert effort and hire one agency. Agencies would compete to be hired and lower their fees. Fees would be low enough to make it convenient for the issuer to hire a second agency.
As the issuer is expected to hire both agencies, she is indifferent about publishing unfavorable ratings. If an unfavorable rating is published, buyers infer that q t =B. If less than two ratings are published, the buyers correctly infer that the issuer is hiding one or more unfavorable ratings, and therefore q t =B. This result contrasts with the models of rating shopping developed by Bolton the cost for rating agencies to obtain a quality signal is small enough.
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A security price larger than zero requires two favorable ratings. Accordingly, the issuer bribes agency A i only if the other agency observes a favorable signal (s −i t =g), or if the two agencies can be bribed at a total cost not exceeding the value of the favorable ratings (β
As a result, a strategic agency faces a trade-off. A small bribe is paid even if the issuer needs to bribe the other agency at the same time, while a high bribe is paid only if the other agency observes a favorable signal. The next lemma characterizes the choice of bribes. 12 As in monopoly, the security price does not depend on the rating fee, so I drop Φ t from p(R t ,Φ t ). 13 The other models of competition between rating agencies (Strausz (2005) , Lo (2010), Camanho and Deb (2012) , and Donaldson and Piacentino (2012)) exogenously limit the issuer to hiring only one agency.
In equilibrium, the rating agencies coordinate their bribes. A "low" bribe β 
I proceed to characterize the single-period equilibrium in case the agencies request high bribes.
By hiring the two agencies, the issuer ensures an expected payoff equal to
The choice of effort maximizes the expected payoff of the issuer:
As stated in the next lemma, Assumption 1 ensures that an equilibrium with positive effort exists for any H. As both ratings are necessary, I only consider equilibria in which the two rating agencies set identical rating fees.
Assumption 4. I consider only equilibria in which φ
With their fees, the rating agencies can extract the entire surplus generated by the issuer's effort, as stated in the next lemma.
Lemma 9.
In the single-period game's equilibrium, the issuer exerts positive effort. The rating agencies require the highest fee that the issuer is willing to pay:
In Appendix A, I characterize the equilibrium of the one-period game in which the rating agencies coordinate on "low" bribes. The next lemma states that the low-bribes equilibrium is characterized by less effort than the high-bribes one.
Lemma 10.
For any H ∈[0,1) 2 , the equilibrium level of effort is lower if rating agencies coordinate on "low" bribes than in the case of high bribes.
Low bribes induce lower effort for two reasons. First, the issuer can simultaneously bribe the two agencies only if the bribes are low. Therefore, when agencies request low bribes, a low-quality security has a larger probability of receiving two favorable ratings than in the case of high bribes.
This results in a lower price for a security that receives two favorable ratings than in case of agencies requesting high bribes. A lower expected price, in turn, reduces the issuer's incentive to invest in quality. Moreover, obtaining favorable ratings when the signals are unfavorable is cheaper under low bribes. By reducing the difference between the payoffs following favorable and unfavorable signals, low bribes reduce even more the incentive to invest in effort.
Quadratic cost example. Figure 6 shows the equilibrium price following two favorable ratings and the issuer's effort, when agencies coordinate on high and low bribes. When the agencies are expected to request low bribes: (i) the buyers pay a lower price for any expected e * and (ii) the issuer exerts less effort for any expected price.
Consider the equilibria of the two-period game. By Lemma 8, low bribes are mutually consistent only if the agencies' reputations satisfy µ
. In general, low bribes ensure larger payoffs than high bribes if every agency believes that the competitor is strategic with a high probability. The next assumption allows me to focus on equilibria in which agencies coordinate on low bribes if their reputations for honesty are low.
Assumption 5. I only consider equilibria in which the rating agencies coordinate on low bribes in period t iff their reputations satisfy µ
In the rest of the section, I characterize the equilibrium in which the rating agencies request high bribes in both periods. Then, I show that this equilibrium ensures more effort in the first period than any equilibrium which involves low bribes. I start characterizing the equilibrium with high bribes from the rating decisions of a strategic agency. In the last period, a strategic agency requests a bribe whenever possible, while in the first period a strategic agency faces a trade-off between a better reputation and a bribe. The reputations are updated to µ i 2 (R 1 ,q 1 ).
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The reputation in the second period satisfies
Because the two agencies rate simultaneously, a competitor's rating provides information about an agency's type. For example, the second-period agents interpret a rating r i 1 =g for a security of quality q 1 =B differently depending on the rating assigned by the other agency. As the issuer bribes an agency only if the other agency receives a signal g, a favorable rating is interpreted as an honest mistake if the other agency publishes an unfavorable rating r The strategic-agency's payoff in the second period depends on the reputations of both agencies. A monopolistic agency that accepts a bribe in the first period only lowers its own expected revenues.
In competition, a lower reputation for either agency lowers the revenues of both agencies. The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium in which the rating agencies coordinate on high bribes in both periods.
Proposition 11.
If in equilibrium the rating agencies coordinate on high bribes, every issuer hires both rating agencies. For every i∈{I,II}, the probability that a strategic agency rates honestly is
and h c (δ) is defined by the implicit function:
In equilibrium the two strategic-type agencies follow the same rating strategy in both periods.
Similarly to the monopoly case, for a low discount factor a strategic agency is not disciplined by the threat of losing its reputation, while for larger discount factors, the strategic-type mimics the honest type, as described in the next corollary. The next lemma is composed of two parts. First, it states that in every equilibrium in which the rating agencies coordinate on low bribes in some period, they will coordinate on low bribes in the first period. Moreover, the strategic agencies coordinate on low bribes only if they strictly prefer to request a bribe. This is the case because an agency that is indifferent between a low bribe and an honest rating should strictly prefer to request a higher bribe. As a result, in any equilibrium that involves low bribes the issuer's effort in the first period is lower than in ther case of high bribes. I proceed to compare equilibria in the regime of competition among rating agencies and in the monopoly regime.
Comparing equilibria
In this section, I compare the expected quality of the first-period security under monopoly and competition. The last-period security is not considered, as the last period amounts to a modeling device to account for reputational concerns of the rating agencies.
A different number of rating agencies can result in different amounts of information generated. My model has little to say about the process through which rating agencies collect their information. In fact, I even assume away any cost to obtain a signal correlated with quality.
Along this line, I consider different market structures while holding constant the overall amount of information available to the rating agencies. I compare the effort choice of the issuer when a monopolistic agency observes two signals of quality and when each of two competing agencies observes a single signal.
The monopolistic regime and the regime of competition differ in the number of ratings assigned. Proposition 4 and Lemma 6 ensure that in both regime the issuer requests a rating from every available rating agency. The regimes also differ in the reputational concerns of the rating agencies. These two dimensions can be considered in turn. Lemma 14 focuses on the effect of increasing the number of agencies, while abstracting from their reputational concerns. This lemma compares equilibria under monopoly and under competition for an exogenously-given probability that a strategic agency requests a bribe. Proposition 15 is the main result of the paper. It states that monopoly can induce more effort than competition with high bribes if the reputational incentives are strong. It also gives a sufficient condition to ensure that, for a large enough discount factor, the monopolist is indeed more informative than the two competitors. Intuitively, if the signal is often wrong (large π) the reputation update of the monopolist is larger than the reputation update of the competitors.
At the same time, the monopolist's reputational motives are stronger because the payoff of the monopolist is more dependent on its reputation than the payoffs of competitors.
Quadratic cost example. Figure 8 describes the equilibrium choice of effort for a quadratic cost function. Effort choice under monopoly is lower for low values of δ. In particular if δ<min δ M ,δ C , in both regimes a strategic agency requests a bribe whenever possible. In this case, Lemma 14 ensures that the buyers are more informed and the issuer has more incentive to invest in effort under rating agency competition. As the issuer's choice of effort is a continuous function of the agencies' discount factor, competition induces more effort than monopoly for any δ below a threshold.
Extension: Identical Signals
Will an issuer exert more effort when competing agencies observe identical signals of quality or when they observe conditionally independent signals of quality? Should policy makers incentivize standardization in the methods used to evaluate financial products? On the one hand, the presence of a competitor observing the same signal of quality can deter an agency from assign- Lemma 17 compares the equilibria of a single period game under competition with different signal structures. I hold constant the overall amount of information received by the rating agencies in the two regimes. This amounts to assuming that under both regimes two signals of quality are generated.
Lemma 17. In the equilibrium of the single period game, the issuer exerts more effort when agencies receive identical signals than when agencies receive conditionally independent signals if
When agencies observe conditionally independent signals, they either coordinate on high or low bribes, as described in Section 4. If agencies coordinate on low bribes, the issuer has less incentive to exert effort than in the regime of identical signals of quality. Consider the equilibria in which the agencies coordinate on high bribes. Consider the two-period game. In the last period, the reputation of the rating agencies among the other agents is updated to µ i 2 (R 1 ,q 1 ). 15 In this case, the second period reputation satisfies 15 Agencies can learn about each others' type more than the other agents do, but in equilibrium the belief about the type of the competing agency will not be determinant for the choice of action of each agency. The payoff of a strategic agency in the second period depends on the reputation of both agencies.
The agency's reputation among the issuer and the buyers determines, respectively, the choice of effort and the willingness to pay for the security. The belief about the type of the competitor determines the expected probability of receiving a bribe. The continuation payoff equals
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium of the game.
Proposition 18. In equilibrium, for every i∈{I,II},
δ s and h s 1 (δ) are defined, respectively, by:
As in the regime of conditionally independent signals, there is a threshold discount factor δ s . The competition regime ensures more effort than monopoly for low discount factors. Proposition 20 ensures that this is the case regardless of the signal structure. Figure 10 shows a numerical example. 
If and only if

Conclusion
My paper represents the first attempt to simultaneously consider rating agencies' reputational incentives and issuers' investments in the quality of their securities. I show that competition among agencies can ensure more investment in a security's quality than monopoly whenever the rating agencies have weak reputational incentives. Reputational incentives can be weak for many reasons. For example, while rating new or complex securities, rating agencies are likely to make many honest mistakes. As a result, inflated ratings will pass unnoticed and will not hurt the agencies' reputations for rating honestly. If the number of new securities to be rated is very high, the reputational incentives can be weak because many ratings are issued before the returns of the securities are observed. The markets for asset-backed securities in the years preceding the financial crisis are an example of market in which a large volume of new and complex securities were rated in a short amount of time, and rating agencies were likely to lack reputational concerns. Therefore, my model supports the regulators' claims that increasing rating competition is in the public interest in these markets.
Other certification models with endogenous product quality (Albano and Lizzeri ( these papers consider ratings for products of exogenous quality and limit the issuer to hiring at most a single rating agency.
My analysis could be extended to consider competition between more than two rating agencies.
In my setting, the issuer hires all the available rating agencies, regardless of their number. The analysis, however, becomes significantly more complicated when more than two rating agencies are available. This is because strategic agencies can coordinate their bribes in many different ways, and the number of possible equilibria increases quite rapidly.
In my model, the structure of the securities market is exogenously determined. After agencies announce their rating fees, a single issuer decides on her effort. It would be interesting, however, to explicitly model the issuer's decision to enter the securities market, and therefore consider the effect of the rating fees on the structure of the securities market. In fact, the rating agencies could potentially demand low fees in order to encourage multiple issuers to enter the market, or high fees that result in a monopoly in the securities market. Ultimately, this extension could provide conditions under which external certifiers should be expected to induce a socially desirable market structure for rated products.
Appendix
Appendix A. Low-Bribes Equilibrium
I first consider the single-period game for a given H. I focus on equilibria in which the rating agencies request identical bribes β I t ,β II t :β I t +β II t =p(g,g|M t ,H). The price of the security is defined by Lemma 6.
If the issuer hires the two agencies, she ensures an expected payoff equal to
The optimal effort choice maximizes the issuer's expected payoff
Assumption 1 ensures that an equilibrium with positive effort exists for any H ∈[0,1) 2 . In equilibrium, the rating agencies extract all the surplus generated by the issuer's effort, as described in the next lemma.
Lemma 22. An equilibrium with positive effort exists for any H ∈[0,1) 2 . In equilibrium, the rating agencies require the highest fee that the issuer is willing to pay
φ I t =φ II t =(1/2)(e * +(1−e * )(π 2 +(π(1−π)/2)Σ i (1−µ i t )(1−h i )))p(g,g|M t ,H)−c(e * )).
Appendix B. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Assumptions 2 and 3 imply that all buyers hold identical beliefs on and out-of the equilibrium path. Therefore, in any PBE: I rule out pathological equilibria in which some type of rating agency requests φ * t >φ t . In any equilibrium in which µ(φ t )=µ t ∀µ t , both types of agency set φ * t =φ t . If instead in equilibrium µ(φ t ) =µ t for some φ t , by Assumption 2, φ t must be on the equilibrium path for some type of agency. But this implies that there is at least another φ t on the equilibrium path s.t. µ(φ t ) =µ(φ t ). WLG let µ(φ t )>µ(φ t ) (i). If the honest type strictly prefers φ t over φ t , then µ(φ t )=0, which contradicts (i). If the honest type is indifferent or strictly prefers φ t over φ t then the strategic type strictly prefers φ t over φ t because β(µ(φ t ),h)>β(µ(φ t ),h), which implies that either µ(φ t )=1 (which contradicts (i)) or φ t is out of the equilibrium path, which is also a contradiction
Proof of Proposition 4.
First of all h * 2 =0. In the last period a strategic agency has no incentive to maintain a reputation for honesty. To characterize the equilibrium, I need to pin down h * 1 and to show that it is optimal for the rating agency -regardless of its type -to set a fee in each period s.t. the issuer is willing to hire the agency. For the moment, I assume that the latter condition is satisfied and I pin down h M * 1 . For s 1 =b, an honest rate ensures a continuation payoff δu M s 2 (µ b (h * 1 )). If instead a bribe is paid, the continuation payoff is p(g|µ 1 
where f (.) is defined in the Proof of 2. As shown in Lemma 2,
Step 2. Note that 
Step
Step 4. From steps 2 and 3, either:
in which case the agency strictly prefers to request a bribe and h M * 1 =0, or there is a unique h M * ∈[0,1] s.t.
Step 5. All is left to show is that is it optimal to set a fee s.t. the issuer is willing to hire the agency. In the last period, Lemma 3 ensures that the agency -regardless of its type -will set a fee equal to the highest willingness to pay of the issuer. In the first period, assume that each type sets a fee s.t. it is not optimal to hire an agency; then the payoff of a honest type equals u C 2 (µ 1 )=(e * +(1−e * )π)p(g|µ 1 ,0)−c(e * ). By deviating to φ 1 :=(e * t +(1−e * t )π)p(g|µ t ,h * 1 )−c(e * t ), the strategic type has a profitable deviation. In fact
As in the first period fees s.t the issuer is not willing to hire the agency can be ruled out, Lemma 3 ensures that the agency -regardless of its type -will set a fee equal to the highest willingness to pay of the issuer
Proof of Lemma 5. Let
. By the Implicit Fun. Theorem:
<0
The last inequality holds as: ∂p(g|µ 1 
If the honest type strictly prefers φ t over φ t , then µ i (φ t )=0, which contradicts (i). If the honest type is indifferent or strictly prefers φ t over φ t , then the strategic type strictly prefers φ t over φ t because β(M (φ t ),H)>β(M (φ t ),H) which implies that either µ i (φ t )=1 (contradicting (i)) or φ t is out of the equilibrium path which is also a contradiction Proof of Lemma 10. Using the definitions in the proofs of Lemma 8 and Lemma 24
Moreover:
then p H >p L . Therefore, the equilibrium price following two favorable ratings is larger if the agencies coordinate on high bribes. Also, the equilibrium effort is larger if agencies coordinate on high bribes, as
Proof of Proposition 11. First of all h I * 2 =h II * 2 =0. In the last period a strategic agency has no incentive to maintain a reputation for honesty. To characterize the equilibrium, I need to pin down h I * 1 ,h II * 1 and to show that it is optimal for the rating agency -regardless of its type -to set a fee in each period s.t. the issuer is willing to hire the agency. For the moment, I assume that the latter condition is satisfied and I pin down h i * 
. This is the case as ∂µ i,g (H * 1 )/∂h i 1 >0, and . )) >0. The inequality holds as ∂p(g,g|M 2 ,0,0)/∂µ i 2 >0 (step 1), and by the Proof of Prop. 4 for x=p(g,g|M 2 ,0,0)}:
Step 3. For δ<δ c h i 1 =0, while for δ≥δ c h I * 1 =h II * t =h c (δ).
Step 5. All is left to show is that is it optimal to set a fee s.t. the issuer is willing to hire the agency. In the last period, Lemma 9 ensures that the agency -regardless of its type -will set a fee equal to the highest willingness to pay of the issuer. I rule out equilibria in which both agencies set a rating fee higher than the fee defined in Lemma 9. In the first period, assume that each type of agency A i sets a fee s.t. it is not optimal to hire an agency: then the payoff of an honest agency equals u CA sufficient condition to ensure that the last inequality holds is: (1−(1−π 2 )e 2 )(1+π)>((1/2)(e 2 +(1−e 2 )π(2−π))−π(1−π)e 2 )2π. This condition holds ∀e 2 ∈[0,1] if π> 1/3.
(∂u C 2 /∂p(g,g|µ C 2 ))(∂p(g,g|µ C 2 )/∂y C 2 )(∂y C 2 /∂µ 2 )dµ 2 . By step 4, the inequality holds for π>1/3. By steps 2 and 3, the following inequality holds for h C 1 ∈ (max{0, (1−π−2µ 1 π)/2π(1−µ)},1) . 3.b µ g (f (h Cequilibrium µ i (φ t ) =µ i t for some φ t , by Assumption 2 φ t must be on the equilibrium path for some type of agency A i . But this implies that there exists at least another φ t on the equilibrium path s.t. µ i (φ t ) =µ i (φ t ). W.l.g. let µ I (φ t )>µ I (φ t ) (i). If the honest type strictly prefers φ t over φ t , then µ i (φ t )=0 which contradicts (i). If the honest type is indifferent or strictly prefers φ t over φ t , then the strategic type strictly prefers φ t over φ t because β(M (φ t ),H)>β(M (φ t ),H), which implies that either µ i (φ t )=1 which contradicts (i) or φ t is out of the equilibrium path, which is also a contradiction
